The links between public administration modernisation, efficiency of public spending, governance and growth are examined for a sample of 38 developed countries (the OECD plus EU countries). Efficiency and governance are shown to be correlated. Also, different measures of governance are significantly correlated to labour productivity. Results suggest that some governance features are more important for growth, namely, the law and order (including judicial system and control of corruption) and regulation quality.
Introduction
A strand of recent economic literature has emphasised the importance of institutions and governance as a deep determinant for growth. In one influential paper, Olson, Sarna and Swamy (2000) claim that differences in "governance" can explain why some developing countries grow rapidly, taking advantage of catching up opportunities, while others lag behind. In these authors assessment, the quality of governance explains in a straightforward manner and in empirical terms, something that neither standard endogenous or exogenous growth models do -why a (small) number of developing countries converge towards higher income levels and therefore display high growth rates.
In this literature strand, "governance" is measurable and reflects the quality of institutions and economic policies. For example, Olson, Sarna and Swamy (2000) have used the ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) as a source, and governance is measured by the risk of expropriation, the risk of repudiation of contracts, and by three variables reflecting administrative effectiveness and the rule of law -the quality of bureaucracy, the level of corruption and the "degree to which the citizens of a country are wiling to accept the authority of established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes" (p. 348). Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) is another important reference in the literature, both in methodological terms and for results attained. The authors provide empirical evidence favouring the idea that current institutions have a strong influence on current economic performance of countries with a colonial past. These institutions, measured by the average protection against expropriation risk, are shaped by the way settlement occurred in the past, "extractive states" being opposed to "neo-Europe" colonies. The authors note that the findings of positive and significant correlation between institutions (or "governance") and economic performance are not a sufficient condition for causality from the former to the latter. Reverse causation could be at work -it could be the case that countries afford better institutions as they become richer. The reverse causation problem is circumvented in econometric terms by resorting to instrumental variables -the "European settler mortality" is used as an instrument, as it is correlated to institutions but not directly to current GDP per head. examine the reverse causality effect. Using the World Bank world-wide governance indicators, they conclude that the positive correlation between the quality of governance and per capita incomes reflects a strong positive causation from better governance to higher per capita income and a weak and even negative causal link from income to governance.
In this paper we are particularly concerned with the links between public administration modernisation and economic growth in developed countries. In our view, public administration modernisation is related to two important outcomes -more efficiency in providing services, and better governance. As previously stated, the link between better governance and economic growth has been established in the recent literature 2 . From our point of view, there are also good reasons to suppose that efficiency in providing services from the part of the public administration is also positively related to growth.
As explained in more detail in the next section, efficiency measurement in public provision is based on a comparison between inputs and outputs. More efficiency is achieved when either more output is provided using the same inputs, or fewer inputs are used in providing given outputs. Some outputs provided by public administrations are very likely to impinge positively on productivity and growth. This is the case of education, research and development, or the legal system. Moreover, even when efficiency is achieved by reducing inputs used, resources are being liberated for other uses, and crowding in may occur inducing more investment and growth.
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section, some previous results on efficiency in public provision of health and education are presented, and some evidence of a link between efficiency and governance is discussed. Section 3 covers the empirical results linking governance and labour productivity in developed countries. We present some new results using different governance indicators, using data from the 2 Other references include Gradstein (2004) , Rivera-Batiz (2002) and Wodon (2005) .
World Economic Forum and from the World Bank. Section 4 concludes. An appendix contains several tables with data. St. Aubyn (2006a, 2006b ) measure efficiency in education and health provision using a two stage DEA (data envelopment analysis). Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea behind a two-stage approach. In a simplified one output and one input DEA problem, A, B and C are found to be efficient and are represented on the production possibilities frontier, while D is an inefficient decision making unit (a country).
Public administration modernisation and efficiency

Methodological issues
Figure 1 Efficiency measurement with data envelopment analysis
The output score for country D equals (d 1 +d 2 )/d 1 , and is higher than one, denoting inefficiency. However, country D inefficiency may be partly ascribed to a "harsh environment" -a number of perturbing environmental factors may imply that country D produces less than the theoretical maximum, even if discretionary inputs are efficiently used. In our example, and if the environment for country D was more favourable (e. g. similar to the sample average), then we would have observed D c . In other words, country D would have produced more and would be nearer the production possibility.
The environment corrected output score would be (d 1c +d 2c )/d 1c , lower than (d 1 +d 2 )/d 1 , and closer to unity.
In St. Aubyn (2006a, 2006b) , inputs and outputs are chosen for both 6education and health, and non-discretionary (or "environment") inputs are considered.
Results for education and health are briefly presented in the next section. 
Some results on education
Some results on health
In what health is concerned, the output is measured by three variables; life expectancy, the infant mortality rate and potential years of life lost. The number of doctors, nurses, hospital beds and magnetic resonance imaging units are the considered inputs. Data on outputs and inputs is summarised in table 3. People health is determined not only by the quality of the health car system, but also by important behavioural variables. Efficiency scores were therefore corrected considering the incidence of tobacco consumption and obesity. GDP per head and education attainment were also included in non-discretionary inputs. Health output efficiency scores and their correction are presented in table 4. Table 4 Health -Corrected output efficiency scores (4) Note: the fully corrected scores do not always add up to the indicated sum since for the cases were the result was below one we truncated it to the unity. Source: Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006b).
Efficiency and governance
Efficiency scores from the first stage DEA are highly correlated to output per head, and this correlation shows up in second stage regressions that allow for the GDP correction included in tables 3 and 4. In table 5 we present results from the simple regression of (uncorrected) efficiency scores in one of the governance indicators to be used in section 3 (the principal component of World Bank indicators).
The correlation of education scores and governance is highly significant. In what concerns health, the relationship seems to be less clear-cut. Interpretation of these results is not straightforward. On the one hand, governance is correlated to income per head, and income per head is one discretionary input shown to be significant by St. Aubyn (2006a, 2006b ). On the other hand, one could sensibly expect that countries with better governance can also be countries where provision of health and education is more efficient. Disentangling these two causal links seems to be an interesting avenue for further research.
Government, governance and growth in developed countries
The data
We want to empirically assess whether there is a statistically significant link between so called "institutional" or "governance related" variables and the economic performance of a nation, reflected in labour or total factor productivity.
Our sample of countries includes all European Union and OECD countries, if data was available. Labour productivity was computed as a percentage of the US in purchasing power parity terms, using raw data from the AMECO database, updated in the spring of 2007. Total factor productivity was also estimated using the same database and assuming an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function with a capital share equal to 1/3 3 . An average from 2000 to 2006 was taken in order to smooth cyclical differences. 100.0%
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As can be seen from figure 2, almost all countries considered have lower labour productivity than the US, the exceptions being Norway and Luxembourg. The sample includes 38 countries. 16 of them exhibit a relative labour productivity figure smaller than two thirds. Incidentally, all new EU members are included in this set. The three subindexes make up the global index, which is plotted in figure 4 for our sample of 38 countries. By construction, no country could achieve more than 7 or less than 1. As one could expect, our sample includes a good number of very high achievers. Among the 20 best achievers in the complete list of 125 economies, only three (Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) are not included in our sample. However, the sample also includes countries that are ranked in the second half of the world table, as is the case of Romania (68th) or Bulgaria (75th). Table 6 presents the basic results concerning three regression models where labour productivity is the dependent variable and the global index or the three subindexes.
Regression results with World Economic Forum indexes
Note, first, that the global index is highly significant in model 1, a simple regression, the p-value being smaller than 0.1%. In model 2, when the three subindexes are considered in a multiple linear regression, only the basic requirements variable is found to be significant, with a p-value equal to 3.3%. In model 3, only the significant basic requirements explanatory variable is retained. The variable is highly significant, and the overall fit of the model, as given by the adjusted R 2 , is the highest in the table.
Figure 7
The three basic requirement pillars included. This last variable is slightly more significant than the latter (a p-value of 2.1% compared to 7.0%). 
Governance and cluster analysis with World Economic Forum data
A careful examination of all 134 factors considered for the Global Competitiveness Index led us to select a subset of 48 which we considered to be more directly related to the governance concept (see table A.4 for the full list of indicators). In a somewhat impressionistic mode, we considered that a factor like "the impact of legal contributions to political parties on public policy" than, for example, "financial market sophistication". These 48 factors are listed in table 9.
Pair wise examination of these 48 factors lead us to realize that cross-country correlations were considerable. In order to both reduce data dimension for further empirical uses and to provide a possibly interesting classification of factors on its own right, we performed cluster analysis across factors.
Cluster analysis proceeds by sequentially associating similar cases into groups or clusters. Each case is characterised by a vector with specific values for variables. There are several methods for measuring similarity and for clustering cases. Here, we have used the Euclidean distance to the group average. In our application, each factor is a case, and each country is a variable 7 . In intuitive terms, two factors will be classified in the same cluster if country scores for each country in those factors are similar. Here, visual inspection of the dendogram leads us to consider six clusters, and the factors that belong to each of them are inside the same rectangle in figure 8 . These factors are also discriminated by cluster in table 9. The constitution of each cluster lead us to name them as following:
-cluster 1 -small government, as a high score in any of these factors is somehow related to the size of government or its degree of interference in some activities (agriculture, labour market), more than to the quality of this interference.
-cluster 2 -fair government, because most factors here are connected to even treatment of agents or no favouritism. The expectations are "government success in ICT promotion" and "government procurement of advanced technology products".
-cluster 3 -openness and competition, as factors here are clearly connected to external barriers to goods, labour and capital flows and to the prevalence of some internal shelters (e. g. the informal sector).
-cluster 4 -law, order and regulation. Factors assigned to this cluster by the algorithm are related to the police, to the prevalence of crime, of bribes, the working of the judicial system and the efficiency and enforcement of different types of regulation.
-Cluster 5 -irregular payments. The name came after the three factors (out of four) that are connected to irregular payments in exports and imports, in taxes and in public utilities.
-Cluster 6 -labour market. It includes only one factor, the flexibility of wage determination.
One can compute a score for each country in each of these clusters by taking the average score for the factors that fall within it. With this procedure, we have computed six new indices, which can be called "small government", "fair government", "openness and competition", "law, order and regulation", "irregular payments" and "labour Governance sub-indexes included: Cluster 1 "small government"
1.07 -regulation 6.01 -agriculture policy costs 6.03 -taxation 6.12 -hiring and firing Cluster 2 "fair government"
1.03 -public trust of politicians 1.05 -favouritism in decisions of government officials 1.16 -effectiveness of law-making bodies 1.19 -impact of legal contributions to parties on public policy 6.25 -distortive effect of taxes 7.10 -government success in ICT promotion 9.04 -government procurement of advanced technology products Cluster 3 "openness and competition"
1.13 -efficacy of corp boards 6.09 -trade barriers 6.10 -foreign ownership restrictions 6.24 -red tape 6.30 -informal sector 6.31 -ease of hiring foreign labor 7.03 -laws relating to ICT 7.09 -govt. prioritization of ICT 7.14 -rules on FDI Cluster 4 "law, order and regulation"
1.01 -property rights 1.02 -diversion public funds 1.04 -judicial independence 1.09 -reliability of police 1.10 -crime and violence 1.11 -org. crime 1.12 -ethical behavior firms 1.14 -protection minority shareholders 1.15 -auditing and accounting 1.17 -quality of information on policies and regulation 1.18 -illegal donations to parties 1.25 -irregular public contracts 1.26 -irregular judicial decisions 1.27 -bribes 1.28 -corruption 1.29 -nepotism 6.23 -local equity market access 6.26 -demanding regulatory standards 6.02 -efficiency legal framework 6.07 -antitrust policy 9.07 -intellectual property protection 10.01 -stringent environment regulations 10.02 -clear and stable regulations Cluster 5 "irregular payments"
1.21 -press freedom 1.22 -irreg payments in exp and imp 1.23 -irreg payments in public utilities 1.24 -irregular payments in tax Cluster 6 "labour market" 6.13 -Flexibility wage determination
Governance regression results with World Economic Forum based data
In the same manner as with other indexes, we have performed regressions of labour productivity on these new indexes.
Model 6 in table 10 is a multiple regression where all clusters are used as explanatory variables. The most significant one is cluster 4, "law, order and regulation", with a pvalue equal to 2.5 percent and a positive coefficient.
In model 7, we have included a principal components (PC) index. This is simply the first principal component of all 48 governance factors. PC is therefore a linear combination of the 48 factors that has the highest possible correlation to each of them 9 .
Model 7 also includes the infrastructure pillar, which proved to be significant in other models as well. The PC variable displays a p-value equal to 7.9 percent, slightly above the traditional 5 percent cutting point.
Finally, model 8, which displays the highest R 2 , take in cluster 4, the "law, order and regulation" index, as an explanatory variable, together with the infrastructure pillar. The "law, order and regulation" index is significant below 5 percent, and the infrastructure p-value is now great than 10 percent (11.2 percent). 
Figure 9
Two alternative governance indexes 
Governance regression results with World Bank based data
The World Bank governance indexes are quite correlated among them. In order to reduce dimension, we have computed the principal component of the six indexes (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.). The result is displayed in figure 10 and in table A.3).
Models 13, 12 and 15 are the ones with a higher fit -suggesting the importance of regulatory quality, government effectiveness and control of corruption. Prob. 0.000 0.000 PC -Principal component, VA -voice and accountability, PS -political stability and absence of violence, GE -government effectiveness, RQ -regulatory quality, RL -rule of law, CC -control of corruption
Conclusions
Results presented in this paper suggest there is an important relationship between governance measures and labour productivity levels in more advanced economies (the "EU plus OECD countries"). This correlation is present for different governance measures. Namely, it is found both using the World Economic Forum and the World Bank governance indicators.
Using data from previous studies on the efficiency of spending on education and health, results presented here also suggest there is a relationship between efficiency and governance. Countries where spending is more efficient, i. e. where outputs are higher for given resources used, are countries with better governance indicators.
Disaggregating of World Economic Forum and World Bank data, and using cluster analysis across indicators, suggests that some governance features are more important for growth, like the law and order (including judicial system and control of corruption) and regulation systems. Successful countries seem to be characterized not so much by small government but much more by good quality governance.
Prospects for further work include: i) more research on the links between efficiency, governance and income levels, disentangling two possible causal links (from efficiency to governance and income or from governance and income to efficiency).
ii) more research on the causal links between governance and growth, probably resorting to instrumental variables.
ii) the performance of robustness tests, namely by including more conditioning variables on the regressions (e. g. education or human capital) 
